5 results
AFTA in the Light of New Economic Developments (1995)
- from THE REGION
- Edited by Daljit Singh, Malcolm Cook
-
- Book:
- Turning Points and Transitions
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 29 May 2019
- Print publication:
- 21 November 2018, pp 67-78
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Introduction
It was at the 1992 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit that the six states made a stronger commitment to a liberal trade regime through the instrument of the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT). They decided to establish an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).
Coming on the heels of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Europe 1992, AFTA did not evolve from a comprehensive and detailed programme of liberalization complete with rules and procedures. In fact the agreement incorporating AFTA was less than 10 pages. Compare this with the NAFTA document exceeding 2,000 pages. Yet AFTA stands out among all attempts in ASEAN at economic co-operation in several ways. First, this was the first time that ASEAN described free trade as its eventual goal, a break from its previous mind-set of cautious liberalization. Second, the Heads of Governments in ASEAN identified 15 product groups for accelerated liberalization, thus avoiding a lengthy process of negotiations among bureaucrats to identify product groups, Third, there was a definite timetable within which free trade would be achieved, that is in 15 years. Finally, the CEPT was a vast improvement over an earlier (1987) programme for enhanced Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA), which allowed for more automatic liberalization of items, deeper margins of preferences, and more product coverage than under PTA. This latter programme did not really progress substantially, suffered from delays in submission of items for liberalization, and some members were behind schedule for as much as two years.
As shown in Figure 1, the CEPT has two tracks: fast and normal. In the fast track, according to the 1992 agreements, the achievement of free trade was to take place in 10 years, that is by 2003. For items with base tariff rates exceeding 20 per cent, reductions were to be spread over 10 years till 2003. For items with rates below 20 per cent, reductions were to be completed by the year 2000.
In the normal track, tariffs of more than 20 per cent were to be reduced in three stages: to 20 per cent by 2001, 15 per cent by 2003, 10 per cent by 2005 and free trade (0–5 per cent) in 2008. For items with tariff rates less than 20 per cent, reductions were to be completed by 2003.
3 - Liberalizing trade in manufactures
-
- By Florian A. Alburo, Professor University of the Philippines; Fellow Institute for International Policy, University of Washington
- Edited by Will Martin, The World Bank, Mari Pangestu, The World Bank
-
- Book:
- Options for Global Trade Reform
- Published online:
- 22 September 2009
- Print publication:
- 27 March 2003, pp 50-70
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
The difficulties involved in reaching agreement at recent WTO meetings, particularly the ill-fated 1999 Seattle Ministerial, have overshadowed the disagreements, conflicts, and uncertainties involved in reaching the Uruguay Round agreement. This agreement was an achievement beyond the mere extension of previous GATT commitments, and even beyond its original goals. Aside from the (expected) reductions in tariffs, the Uruguay Round agreement extended the application of multilateral rules and disciplines to areas previously not covered by effective disciplines – trade in agriculture and in textiles and clothing. The agreement also extended multilateral rules and disciplines to trade in services (through the General Agreement on Trade in Services, or GATS), trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) and trade-related investment measures (TRIMs).
At Singapore in 1996, the first WTO Ministerial Conference, which reviewed progress in implementing the Uruguay Round agreement, introduced a number of new issues, including trade and the environment; trade and foreign investment; trade and competition; and trade facilitation – as part of an expanded mandate for the organization. However, no agreement was reached on how to deal with these issues. Many of the divisions at this conference were along North–South lines, with developing countries lukewarm about giving priority to these new issues, and being more eager to focus on implementation of the Uruguay Round agreement.
These divisions re-emerged at the critical third Ministerial Meeting of the WTO, held in Seattle in November 1999.
3 - Competitiveness and Sustainable Growth in ASEAN
-
- By Florian A. Alburo, Professor of Economics in the School of Economics, University of the Philippines.
-
- Book:
- ASEAN Beyond the Regional Crisis
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 03 November 2017
- Print publication:
- 19 March 2001, pp 29-47
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Overview
More than a year after the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis, there still does not seem to be a consensus on the proximate causes and hence what measures ought to be taken to avert its recurrence. Despite the numerous papers (scholarly as well as popular), conferences, publications, and official meetings that have proliferated since the start of the crisis, there is no convergence on its explanation — its unpredicted occurrence, its severity, and its wide spread across Asia and the rest of the world. At one extreme is a school of thought that the crisis was caused by fundamental weaknesses in the economies of the affected countries, manifested by macroeconomic imbalances, excessive borrowings, overvalued currencies, and poor investments, among other things (Moreno, et al. 1998; Glick 1998). At the other extreme is an argument that the crisis was triggered by speculators and their panic behaviour by withdrawing from the emerging markets in fear of losses (Moreno et al. 1998; Montes 1998). Between these two extremes are various shades of explanation. There is the notion of a lack of governance in both public and private transactions, especially in terms of close relationships between financial institutions and regulators. There is the notion that corruption weakened the system of investment decision-making in the emerging markets. There is the notion that “Asian values” had dictated the manner of financial exchanges. There is the notion that the crisis was essentially a bubble crisis (Nomura 1999). While the truth may lie somewhere between these two extremes, they have different policy implications. If the crisis was caused by fundamental weaknesses in the economy, the crisis-hit countries should carry out reforms to improve the foundation for sustainable development. On the other hand, if the crisis was caused by the sudden loss of confidence among short-term investors and speculators not directly related to country fundamentals, then the essential task is not really reforms, nor would they be necessary. Restoring confidence where the basic fundamentals are “correct” may require other measures that would bring back investors. Without a clear explanation for the crisis in the affected countries, it would be difficult to prescribe policy options.
XIX - The ASEAN Summit and ASEAN Economic Cooperation
-
- By Florian A. Alburo, National Economic and Development Authority, Manila, Philippines
- Edited by Seiji Naya, Akira Takayama
-
- Book:
- Economic Development in East and Southeast Asia
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 01 January 1990, pp 299-306
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Introduction
The heads of governments of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) — Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand — met in December 1987 at the ASEAN Summit in Manila. The fact that the Summit was not postponed nor moved to another venue and that no untoward incident happened despite the strained and potentially explosive situation in the country was viewed in the Philippines as a distinct signal of political stability. It also gained for the government some degree of political mileage.
However, we should not be distracted from the substance of the Summit meeting where new initiatives, especially for economic cooperation, were considered and approved. After all, the Summit was simply the mechanism for which more innovative schemes to move the ASEAN cooperative spirit forward were launched.
This paper looks into the economic context of the ASEAN Summit and its prospects for regional economic cooperation. Do set the tone for the paper, the relevant framework is examined briefly in the next section. In subsequent sections, previous attempts at economic cooperation in ASEAN and the reasons for their shortcomings are also reviewed, and the Summit proposals for economic cooperation are laid out in general terms. In the final section, the paper concludes with the implications of the Summit proposals and their contribution toward greater ASEAN economic cooperation.
Theory and Tradition
The theoretical rationale behind regional economic integration is the notion in trade theory that a partial move towards freer trade improves welfare among the member nations. The removal or reduction of tariffs among the member countries should improve resource allocation and expand markets. In addition, there is a greater scope for improved efficiency if the countries produce similar products. Thus, whether integration is only beginning, such as in the case of a free trade area, or will move along higher forms (for example, a customs union, a common market, or an economic union), freer trade will be beneficial.
In the theory of the second-best, however, we are warned that not every move towards free trade is welfare-improving (Viner 1950; Lipsey 1960). If integration leads to trade diversion away from efficient sources under a nondiscriminatory situation to an inefficient partner source under the integration scheme, then resource misallocation takes place. If this trade diversion outweighs the trade creation, then integration may not be welfare-improving overall.
IV - Trade Policy Options for the Philippines
-
- By Florian Alburo, University of the Philippines, Erlinda Medalla, Philippines Institute of Development Studies, Filologo Pante Jr, Institute of Development Studies, Manila
-
- Book:
- The Uruguay Round
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 01 January 1988, pp 104-131
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Introduction
This paper explores trade options for the Philippines in the forthcoming Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. We do not purport to be exhaustive in identifying a wide range of alternatives nor do we claim to have the best ideas concerning the stance the country should take in the negotiations.
The specific objectives of this paper are: (a) to review the trade experience of the Philippines; (b) to indicate some policy options in the context of the Uruguay Round; (c) to describe the products or markets which have apparent importance to the Philippines in the present round, the priorities the country can take, and the new issues that will be covered in the round; and (d) to suggest some strategies which can be pursued by the Philippines in the round.
Trade Structure and Performance
The trade and exchange controls of the 1950s created an economic environment favourable to full-scale import substitution as consumer-goods industries profited from relatively free imports of capital goods and the high domestic price of finished products engendered by the system. The foreign exchange needs of the import-substituting industries were satisfied mainly through the exports of commercial agricultural crops and not through the concomitant break-out into industrial exports. As a result, Philippine exports have been characterized by products with low value added, weak inter-industry linkages, excessive concentration on a few items and continuing reliance on agriculture or agriculture-related products in terms of net foreign exchange earnings, the respectable surge of non-traditional manufactured exports in the late 1970s notwithstanding.